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A Mudança de Auditor: O Caso Português 
 
RESUMO 
A problemática existente em redor da mudança de auditor e a opinião emitida pelo auditor através 
do relatório de auditoria financeira tem-se revelado um tema importante. 
O objetivo da presente investigação consiste em analisar em que medida a mudança do auditor 
está relacionada com o tipo de opinião que o auditor expressa no relatório de auditoria.  
Para alcançar o referido objetivo realizou-se um estudo empírico suportado numa amostra de um 
conjunto de entidades com valores admitidos à negociação na bolsa portuguesa, no período entre 
2006 e 2012 (sete anos) e utilizou-se uma regressão logística para testar se a receção do relatório 
de auditoria financeira modificado indiciava a mudança de auditor. 
As conclusões apontam para a existência de uma relação significativamente positiva entre o 
relatório de auditoria qualificado e a mudança de auditor, verificável para as reservas sobre o ativo 
e outras, mas não para as reservas sobre o capital próprio e alheio. 
O maior número de reservas ocorre nos anos de 2007, 2009 e 2011, a maioria da natureza das 
reservas é relativa ao capital próprio e ao ativo, e que a mudança de auditor está mais associada às 
reservas sobre o ativo e outras reservas, do que às reservas sobre os capitais próprios e alheios.  
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Auditoria, opinião do auditor, mudança do auditor e relatório de auditoria, 
regressão logística, stakeholders. 
 
The Change of Auditor: The Portuguese Case 
ABSTRACT 
The existing problem around the change of auditor and the opinion issued by the auditor through 
the financial audit report has proved to be an important issue. 
The objective of this research is to examine to what extent the change of auditor is related to the 
type of opinion that the auditor expressed in the audit report. 
In pursuit of this objective was carried out an empirical study supported a sample from a set of 
entities with securities admitted to trading on the Portuguese stock market in the period between 
2006 and 2012 (seven years) and used logistic regression to test whether the reception the 
modified financial audit report indicated the change of auditor. 
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The findings point to the existence of a significant positive relationship between the qualified 
audit report and a change of auditor, verifiable for the reserves on assets and other, but not to the 
reserves on own and borrowed funds. 
The largest number of reserves occurs in the years 2007, 2009 and 2011, most of nature reserves is 
related to equity and assets, and the change of auditor is more associated with reserves on assets 
and other reserves than the reserves on own and borrowed funds. 
KEYWORDS: Audit, the auditor's opinion, the auditor change and audit report, logistic 
regression, stakeholders.  
 
El Cambio de Auditor: El Caso Portugués 
RESUMEN 
 
Los problemas existentes relativos al cambio de auditor y a la opinión emitida por el auditor a 
través del informe de la auditoría financiera está probado que se trata de un tema de gran interés. 
El objetivo de esta investigación es examinar hasta que punto el cambio de auditor está 
relacionado con el tipo de opinión que el auditor expresa en el informe de la auditoría. 
En la consecución de este objetivo se llevó a cabo un estudio empírico apoyado en una muestra, 
un conjunto de entidades con valores admitidos a negociación en el mercado de valores portugués, 
en el período comprendido entre 2006 y 2012 (siete años) mediante regresión logística utilizada 
para comprobar si la recepción del informe de auditoría financiera lleva al cambio de auditor. 
Los resultados apuntan a la existencia de una relación positiva significativa entre el informe de 
auditoría y el cambio de auditor, verificable por las reservas de activos y otros, pero no a las 
reservas de los fondos propios y prestados. 
El mayor número de reservas se produce en los años 2007, 2009 y 2011, la mayor parte de las 
reservas naturales se relaciona con la equidad y activos, y el cambio de auditor está más asociado 
con las reservas de activos y otras reservas que con las reservas de los fondos propios y ajenos. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Auditoría, opinión del auditor, informe del cambio de auditor y de la 
auditoría, partes interesadas y regresión logística. 
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The Change of Auditor: The Portuguese Case 
1. Introduction 
The audit report issues the auditor’s opinion on the financial demonstrations of the enterprise, such 
that it becomes of huge importance, both for the users of the financial information and for the 
administration of the enterprise. 
However, the users of the financial information often misunderstand that the auditor’s opinion is 
too technical and concise and the administration of the enterprises may be tempted to relate the 
auditor’s continuity with his/ her opinion. 
The research undertaken studies the relationship between the kind of opinion issued by the auditor 
in his/ her annual report and the change of auditor, in terms of his/ her continuity, from a sample 
of entities with values admitted to trade in the Portuguese stock market, in the period between 
2006 and 2012, and used logistic regression to test whether the reception of the audit report from 
four types of reservations indicated the change of auditor. 
 
The article is structured in four parts: the first one discloses the audit’s theoretical context in terms 
of the report and the auditor’s opinion and the second one reviews the factors that explain the 
change of the auditor, the third develops the empirical study in terms of sampling and variables, 
and the fourth and last part discusses the results. 
In the current economical and social context of our society this article aims to enhance the 
scientific contribute on the issue of the change of auditor, which has given rise to so much 
controversy from the researchers and authors in the science community. 
This research advantageously enhances the nature and the potential impact of the information 
provided by the auditor to anyone interested in the entities and allows stakeholders to question the 
administration on the information reliability and the current auditor’s trust. 
2 – Audit’s theoretical framework 
2.1 – The audit report 
The audit report is the document where the auditor issues his/ her opinion on the financial 
demonstrations of the enterprise audited, such that this opinion is regarded by society as having a 
public character. There are six types of opinions: without reservations, without reservations and 
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with emphasis, with reservations by range limitation, with reservations by disagreement, adverse 
and disclaimer of opinion. 
The audit report is often regarded as a “barometer” for the enterprise’s financial situation and not 
only as a document that reveals reliability on the financial demonstrations (Arens, 1996), such that 
the audit report is the climax of the audit process through which the auditor issues his/ her opinion 
on the audited financial demonstrations or the reasons not to issue them. 
Under that line of thought, Becker et al (1998) states that the audit reduces the existing 
information differences among the managers and the remaining people interested on the 
enterprise, since the users of such information gain access to reliable financial demonstrations 
through the certification conveyed by the auditor.  
Thus, the message issued by the auditor must be perfectly understood and its function clearly 
defined, that is, “the issuer task is to fight for a simple, clear, interesting and interactive message, 
in such a way that it conveys at least the main points to the public target” (Kotler, 1996). 
To Pasiouras, et al (2007) the audit report consists of a report where the auditor issues an opinion 
regarding the financial demonstrations of the audited enterprise, enhancing whether they are free 
from relevant distortions and whether they were developed according to the specific current 
legislation and follow the accounting norms and principles. 
Also to Hope and Langli (2010), the audit report is an instrument of communication, wherein the 
related parts are informed on the conclusions provided by the auditor, as well as on the possible 
problems found in the internal controls and/or the financial demonstrations of the enterprises 
audited, including those regarding the enterprise ability to continue. 
The justified theories of the audit in the present society must be framed in the financial 
information area since the audit report and its publishing are a reliability element added to that 
information. 
Finding an adequate theory to explain its existence is, in the opinion of Almeida and Silva (2013) 
an academic and intellectual challenge, wherein the agency’s theory is the one which is more 
inclusive and unifying of the various justifying theories. 
The agency’s theory comes from the separation between property and entities management, which 
has given rise to differences in the information and agency conflicts among owners and managers, 
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thus strengthening the auditor’s role for its reliability and credibility provided to the society since 
it forms an instrument of screening and reduction of the agency’s conflict. 
This way, by being part of the social control process (Lee, 1996) or of the responsibility of 
providing the accounts (Flint, 1988) the audit is justified on the basis of the agency’s theory, 
which is regarded to a certain extent as a cover for the risk of information (Porter et al, 2008). 
In the same line, Almeida and Silva stated that “the auditor may be seen as a referee who defines 
the consistency of the financial demonstrations developed by the agent, taking as a pattern the 
rules of accounting (…) and as such the auditor is regarded as an agent who verifies the actions 
of another in a context of minimization of the main cost” (p. 48). 
Nonetheless, it is also important to refer that the auditory is related to the theory of signalling 
(disclosure and transparency regarding the market signals the entity and may reduce the financing 
costs), to the decision taking theory (as it allows for the assessment of the information value to 
potentiate better decisions, according to Saada, 2000), to the theory of the government of societies 
(according to Power (1997) as it is an inclusive part of the architecture of control imposed by 
internal or external motives), the theory of insurance (according to Cosserat and Rodda (2009) the 
insolvency is sought to be associated with an audit’s flaw, supported by the assumption that the 
release of fraud financial information is also the auditor’s responsibility). 
2.2 – The relevance and understanding of the audit report 
Authors such as Siqueira (2004), Boynton, et al (2002), Wiesner (1987), Ricchiute (2002) and 
Elena Cabal (2001) and national and international organizations such as the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & 
Wales (ICAEW), the Compagnie 
Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC), the Ordem dos Revisores Oficiais de Contas 
(OROC), 
the Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas (ICAC), the International Federation of 
Accountants 
(IFAC) and the European Federation of Accountants have been concerned about the clarification 
of the audit report’s main causes for not being fully understood. The main reasons for the report’s 
lack of understanding are as follows: 
 Standardized report: as the structure of the report is according to the norms, regardless of 
the activity sector it is applied to, it becomes more a symbolic document than a 
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communication between the auditor and the user, which leads to the users not reading the 
audit reports. 
 Technical language: the commission for the auditor’s responsibilities (Cohen Commission) 
enhances the use of a highly standardized language which results in an ambiguity for most 
of the users who often lack the accountant or audit skills. 
The users are not familiar with the terminology used in the reports and that is why they find it 
difficult to understand the message transmitted. If the aim of the audit report is to give credibility 
to the financial demonstrations issued by an enterprise it becomes crucial that its users understand 
it. 
Thus, Garcia Benau and Pucheta Martínez (2001) have realized that on the one hand the excessive 
use of technical terms in the audit report and on the other hand the report’s content being too 
concise make it difficult to understand. Gay and Schelluch (2006), in their research on this issue, 
enhance the uncertainty in the understanding of the audit report from most of the stakeholders. 
 The responsibility of the audit report isn’t clarified. Ruiz Barbadillo (1998) believes that 
despite the research carried out in the previous decades, the audit report still does not allow 
its users to understand its nature and the asset that is the information conveyed in it. 
That idea is shared by López Combarros (1996) when he defends that “regarding these areas it is 
necessary to communicate to the users of the financial demonstrations the exact range of the work 
we hope to perform and the level of responsibility we take on.” 
In a research performed by Schelluch and Gay (2006), the conclusions were that the auditors 
believe to have higher levels of responsibility and accountability than that which is actually 
conferred to them by the users of the financial information. The shareholders sceptical attitude 
probably comes from the recent financial scandals in the enterprises. 
3- Explaining factors of the change of auditor 
The auditor is responsible for alerting the administration about the weaknesses, uncertainties or 
irregularities found, which are often materially relevant and must therefore be mentioned in the 
auditor’s report, and which give rise to a qualified auditor’s report, and as such the qualified 
auditor’s report may have particular consequences: the enterprise’s administration may “press” the 
auditor to issue an auditor’s report without reservations, as the value of the shares as well as the 
administration fees may be affected (Chow and Rice, 1982). 
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The administration will try to eliminate the possibility of the auditor of issuing qualified auditor’s 
reports as those reports may have a negative impact on the perception of the stakeholders over the 
administration in general and the enterprise in particular. 
The enterprise scandal that involved Enron and the associated audit enterprise, Arthur Andersen, 
has started the discussion on the auditor’s independency through the process of auditing, since the 
hiring period of the auditor is of about 10 years. Thus, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was being 
implemented there was a suggestion of implementing the requirement of change of auditor in the 
USA, which never really happened (Defond and François, 2005). 
However, the change of auditor has been implemented in India, Australia, Singapore, South 
Chorea,  Hong Kong, among others. In Portugal, the CMVM has implemented the change of 
auditors for the enterprises with open capital. 
The literature about the qualified audit reports and the change of auditor is linked. The most 
advocated variables to justify the auditor’s opinion in the report include, amongst others: 
 Audit’s enterprise fees (Mckeown, et al 1991; Addams and Davis, 1994); 
 Financial issues (Haskins and Williams, 1990; Carpenter and Strawser, 1971); 
 Change of Administration (Burton and Roberts, 1967; Carpenter and Strawser,1971); 
 Enterprise size (Warren, 1980; Shank and Murdock, 1979; Chow and Rice, 1982). 
For the last decades several empirical researches have been carried out both in Europe and in the 
United States of America, highlighting a set of variables related to the change of auditor, namely 
financial issues, entity size and administration or change of financial manager. 
From the set of researches performed, the Smith’s (1986) performed in the USA show that only 
4% of the change of auditor comes from the issuing of a qualified opinion. 
Worth referring to is another research performed in the USA by Davidson, Wallace, Jirporn and 
Dadalt (2004) on the potential reasons for the change of the auditor, which are based on situations 
in which the managers look for an audit of an inferior rank with costs for the agency, that is, 
signalling the existence of issues on the quality of the financial auditory. 
Also, in Europe, namely in the United Kingdom, a research has been performed by Hubaid and 
Cooke (2005), wherein it was realized that the entities with more financial issues and where there 
is the change of the financial manager are more inclined to get a qualified opinion from the auditor 
and that the likelihood of the change of auditor rises with the gravity of the opinion. 
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The worldwide literature has performed various researches related to the reasons that cause the 
enterprises to change the auditor as stated above and which are centred on two approaches. 
One is the market approach in which the change of auditor is analyzed according to the nature of 
the audit demand that the enterprises carry out and the supply performed by the audit 
professionals. The change of auditor is related to the changes in the economic-financial and 
corporative features of the enterprises (Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Johnson and 
Lys, 1990; Firth, 1999). 
The other approach is contractual, which focuses on the perception of the audit as a contract in 
which the enterprise freely appoints the auditor and where the possibility of a disagreement 
between the auditor and the enterprise may lead to a decision from the enterprise to change the 
auditor (Lennox, 2000; Francis and Krishnan, 1999). 
Summing up, we can conclude that there is a difference concerning the impact of the audit report 
and the change of the auditor. If, on the one hand some authors point out the change as a result of 
the clients search for auditors who issue a clear opinion, on the other hand, organizations such as 
SEC (2000) and authors such as Petty and Gugaresan (1996) defend the need to impose measures 
of mandatory rotation of the auditors, arguing that long contracts reduce the auditors motivation to 
keep an independent relationship with the clients. 
 
4- Empirical research 
4.1- Population and Sampling 
The population target consists of the entities issuing security values admitted to trade in a 
continuous market in the Portuguese stock market, and the sampling is based on the above 
mentioned entities that have provided their financial demonstrations on the internet site of the 
“Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários” (CMVM) during the month of July 2013, 
corresponding to the period between 2006 and 2012 (for seven years). 
Hence it came that the population consisted of 120 entities, of which 37 were cut (as they did not 
present any kind of economic-financial information, both on the internet site of the CMVM and 
their own internet site) and 26 (for being financial entities, therefore their financial demonstrations 
disclosed a specific framework not comparable to the other entities), wherein the sample consists 
of 57 entities, which represent about 69% of the total entities. 
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These 57 entities were analyzed in a consistent manner throughout the research period even if at 
some times they were not included in the list of issuing entities, according to the CMVM and, 
altogether a set of 337 observations were achieved during the research period of time. 
4.2- Description of the research and Variables 
In order to analyze to what extent the change of auditors can be explained by the auditor’s report 
itself, we have graded the auditor’s reports in a period of seven years, that is, without reservations 
and ranked, as this leads to a more consistent picture as well as a more objective reality (Cho and 
Trent, 2006). 
Thus, Patton (2002) has adopted an identical procedure of explanation, as it contributes to the 
validity and reliability, building a more faithful picture of the phenomenon through convergence. 
We have adopted the statistical technique of logistic regression, just as MacFadden (1973), Ismail, 
et al (2008) and Heliodoro (2014) have defended and used to analyze the relationship between the 
dependent variable θ (Yn) – change of auditor (which takes on the value of 1. When there is a 
change of auditor and the value 0 (zero) in the opposite situation) – and four independent 
variables, estimated by the method of maximum similitude, which are: 
 Reservations relative to their own capital; 
 Reservations regarding borrowed capital; 
 Reservations on the asset; 
 Other reservations not mentioned in the ones described above. 
Table 1 enhances the variables which were the object of research, that is, the dependent variable as 
well as the four independent variables. 
 
Table 1  
 
The selection of independent variables allows for the realization of to what extent the entities in 
the sampling have changed their auditors, for having received a qualified opinion, which is 
considered as relevant and the object of international acknowledgement by the scientific 
community, by Ball, et al (1979); Ballesta and García-Meca (2005); Brio (1998) and Gomez 
Aguilar and Ruiz Barbadillo (200; 2003) and Senteney et al (2006). 
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Logistic regression is a statistical technique that aims at producing, from a set of observations, a 
model that allows for the prediction of values on the basis of one or more variables ranked as 
independent variables and considered binary. 
The research was based on the reports and accounts and on the audit of the different entities that 
were the object of the research in order to identify the typology of the auditor and his/her stay in 
the entity through time, as well as the number and type of reservations, wherein the Statistical 
Package for the Science Social (SPSS), version 21, was used for the needed statistical analysis. 
5- Results Analysis 
The assessment of the results achieved consists of a descriptive analysis of the constant 
reservations of the audit report and the logistic regression. 
Regarding the type of reservations the following has been found: 
 In terms of time the rise in the number of reservations between 2006 and 2007 – 305 
reservations were reported in this period, which represent an average of 43.57 reservations 
every year, wherein the number of reservations shifted between a minimum of 33 (in 2012) 
and a maximum of 51 (in 2007), as can be seen in Table 2. It should be highlighted that 
there is a higher number of reservations in years of legislative elections (2009 and 2011) 
and that, at the same time, there is a lower number of reservations in the year before the 
legislative elections (2008 and 2010), except for the year 2012. 
Table 2                                                                                                                                                                    
 In terms of the type of reservations it is clear that the higher number of reservations 
concerns own capital (106, about 35%), followed by the reservations on the asset (70, 
approximately 23%), the other reservations (68, which represent 22%) and, finally, the 
reservations concerning the borrowed capital (61, about 20%). 
 If we consider the type of reservations it becomes clear that the highest number of 
reservations concerns own capital and other reservations and that the lowest number 
concerns the reservations on borrowed capital, as can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3                                                                                                                                                                      
We have found that the highest number of reservations (7) refers to own capital (covering eight 
entities), followed by reservations on asset and other reservations (four entities each) and, lastly, 
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the reservations on borrowed capital (seven) in two of the types identified, which is the case of 
Refer (reservations on own capital and borrowed capital), FCP (reservations on own capital and 
other reservations) and Parque Expo 98 (reservations on borrowed capital). 
Concerning the result of logistic regression, a level of significance has been defined (α) of 0,1 as it 
is an acceptable probability (Newbold, 1995) and when the coefficient of the variables present a p-
value lower than the level of significance defined (p-value >α), then there is an influence of this 
independent variable, hence Table 4 . 
Table 4                                                                                                                                                                  
Bearing in mind the results of the Wald test, shown in Table 4, we have concluded that the 
independent variables disclose two different behaviours: 
 Inductor to the change of the auditor from the independent variable 3 – Reservations on the 
Asset from N-1 to N-3 (ResAT) and the independent variable 4 – Other reservations from 
N-1 to N-3 (ResOR) – for disclosing a p-value lower than the level of significance defined 
(α= 0,1), thus affecting the dependent variable – the change of auditor – that is, the 
existence of these two types of reservations in the audit report is an important factor to 
allow for a change of the auditor by the enterprise audited; 
 Non-inductor to the change of the auditor from the independent variable 1 – Reservations 
on own Capital from N-1 to N-3 (ResCP) – and the independent variable 2 – Reservations 
on Borrowed Capital from N-1 to N-3 (ResCA) – for disclosing a p-value higher than the 
level of significance defined (α= 0,1), not affecting the dependent variable – the change of 
the auditor – that is, the existence of these two types of reservations is not a decisive factor 
to replace the auditor. 
Conclusion 
 Different authors defend that there are many factors that influence the change of the auditor, 
wherein there are different approaches that try to explain them, namely the contractual approach 
and the traditional one. 
The audit reports of the entities that issue securities admitted to trade in a continuous market in the 
Portuguese stock market and that consist of our sample in the period between 2006 and 2012 
enhance 305 reservations that: 
 Refer to an annual average of 43.57 reservations; 
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 Most of the reservations (58%) are relative both to own capital (with 35%) and to asset 
(with 23%); 
Referring mostly to entities with public capital (with about 55%), followed at a great distance the 
sportive anonymous societies (with 27%) and the entities with private capital (with the remaining 
18%). 
The change of the auditor (dependent variable) is influenced by the situation of several types of 
reservations (independent variables) as the following has been found: 
 The non-existence of reservations has led to the keeping of the auditor in about 66% of the 
cases; 
 The finding of one to seven reservations led to, on the one hand, a change of the auditor (in 
about 50% of the cases) and, on the other hand, to two changes of the auditor (in 33% of 
the situations); 
 The reservations on the asset and others are decisive to the change of the auditor, according 
to the result of the logistic regression carried out; 
 The reservations on own capital and borrowed capital do not contribute to the change of 
the auditor, as a consequence of the logistic regression carried out. 
The change of the auditor may be a consequence of an intentional behaviour carried out by the 
entity in order to avoid the adverse image before the users of the accounting financial information 
of the financial audit report, that is, the entities that can change the auditor do it in an intentional 
way so as to prevent a negative image from the stockholders. 
The existence of reservations on the asset and others in the audit reports are the most relevant and 
the ones that contribute to the change of the auditor as the entities seek to save the “value of the 
active”, which adds up to the stakeholders satisfaction. 
The conclusions of the research are limited to the number of entities in the sample and to the 
period of time analyzed. If the period of time were longer and the sample size were larger, then the 
results could eventually be more consistent. 
In spite of the above mentioned limitations the research undertaken has contributed for a better 
understanding of the existing relationship between the type of opinion issued by the auditor 
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